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1.    Summary/Introduction 
The OECD countries have, during the four last decades experienced, a decline in fertility 
rates and an increase in life expectancy (UN, 2003). During the next 50 years the ratio of the 
number of workers to the number of elderly people will decline. The challenge is to meet the 
consumption needs. Many economists argue that a reformation of the present pension 
schemes is needed, and a transformation from the commonly used pay-as-you-go1 (paygo) 
schemes to funding has been promoted, e.g. Modigliani et al (2000). 
Poor countries have had a different demographic development, where many of them have 
high population growth rates that will result in much larger ratios of potential workers to the 
elderly than the OECD countries. There is also less capital equipment in poor countries than 
in the industrialized countries, which, in combination with the different demographic 
development, gives lower capital/labour ratios in poor countries. 
This thesis discusses whether these differences between countries could cause interaction 
leading to a ‘win-win’ situation2. The interaction could be trade or factor movements, or 
both. The theoretical starting point for the discussion will be the neoclassical framework, 
which predicts gains from interactions between countries with different factor endowments.  
The simplest neoclassical3 production function with only two inputs, capital and labour, 
predicts that the return to capital will be higher in relative capital scarce countries than in 
capital rich ones. If this is true, one should observe a higher return to capital in poor than in 
rich countries. When capital is assumed to be mobile between countries, this could result in 
capital movements from rich to poor countries. Although many barriers of capital 
movements have been removed, these movements are not observed. This is sometimes 
referred to as the Lucas’ paradox, after the Chicago school economist Robert E. Lucas. In 
chapter 3 of this thesis this paradox is discussed within the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
                                                 
1 Paygo is the system of most countries with a social security system to day. The young, working generations are paying the 
benefits for the retired to day, while the coming working generation is going to pay the benefits for the people working 
today. Contributions from the working population is used to pay the pensions and thus to finance the consumption of the 
retired. Young workers contribute a fixed proportion of their labour income to the system, and the proceedings are divided 
into a lump sum among the retirees. Individuals who retire at mandatory age receive the full pension. The received benefits 
are decided from how many currently retired, how many currently working, and the worker’s income (GDP). If this is not 
the case, government uses other resources than pension contributions to finance benefits. 
2 A win-win situation is a situation where interaction will make all parts better off.  
3 In this thesis the term ‘neoclassical’ will refer to the production functions with decreasing returns to scale with respect to 
each factor of production, in addition to a utility concept with the same properties; the utility is increasing, but the increase 
is decreasing as access to one good increases. The marginalist economics is sometimes regarded as covering the same 
aspects as neoclassical.   
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framework. It is concluded that a reformulation of the paradox may be necessary in a 
situation where labour intensive goods is less tradable than capital intensive goods. The 
possibility that labour intensive goods tend to be less tradable than capital-intensive goods 
should be added to the discussion of the Lucas’ paradox.  
There is a debate on which pension system will be best suited given the demographic 
changes described above. In chapter 2 an introduction to relevant parts of the debate is given. 
In addition to providing the introduction to the discussion, this paper to a limited extent 
provides input to the debate itself. Chapter 2 also gives a description of the demographics in 
the OECD and the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund.  
Chapter 4 discusses saving for future consumption through foreign investment. As 
Norway has already invested parts of the petroleum income in foreign countries to cater for 
future consumption needs, the country provides an interesting case for the pension debate.  
The focus will be on whether or not non-traded goods can become traded, if money is spent 
to break down barriers to trade. This provides the rationale for using the general discussion 
of capital investments for future consumption to discuss the investments done by Norwegian 
authorities, when investing some of the oil revenues in a fund for future consumption. The 
fund in question is The Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund (PF), and is, with only few, 
small exceptions, invested in other OECD countries. This is called a world market portfolio 
investment, although not all markets in the world are invested in. The discussion will raise 
the question whether the PF should be invested in a world market portfolio, which is done 
today, or invested to break down barriers to trade in labour intensive goods from a poor 
country. 
The consequences of the investment of the fund in the rich and the poor country will be 
discussed using the same neoclassical framework as in chapter 3. Two questions will be 
important in the discussion of whether or not the PF should be invested in the OECD 
countries:  
1) Will the coming transformation of the pension schemes in OECD countries lead to 
lower rents on capital investments? 
2) Can the PF be transformed into goods that fit the future consumption needs of an 
aging population? 
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1. The Challenging future 
 
The OECD countries have a demographic situation that provides both current pension 
systems and future consumption needs, with a challenge. The ratio of the number of workers 
to the number of elderly in the population is decreasing. The need for service provision for 
the old is growing, leading to a higher demand for labour in the service sector. On the other 
hand, as shown below, the total supply of labour for the economy is decreasing. If the capital 
stock is fixed or grow at a positive rate, the capital/labour ratio in these countries will grow.  
Poor countries, outside the OECD, also face a challenge, concerning how to meet future 
consumption needs. The demographic situation in these countries is different from that of the 
OECD; the population growth results in a much smaller rate of elderly to the working 
population, although the rate increases as shown in diagram 1. In this paper, lack of capital is 
seen as the main indicator of poverty at a national level. The flow of capital from abroad, in 
addition to the domestic savings, will probably be lower in many poor countries than the 
population growth. If the savings rate and the rate of inflow of foreign capital are constant, 
the result is a decreasing capital/labour ratio. 
The neoclassical models of production, predict that differences in capital/labour ratios 
between countries should result in trade, migration or capital movements. In this tradition, 
one or more of the following effects of current demographic trends are predicted:  
 
- Capital will move from rich to poor countries where the rate of return is higher 
- Labour will move to the rich countries where the wage is higher 
- Trade will occur; capital intensive goods will be sent from the rich countries to the 
poorer ones, while labour intensive goods will go in the opposite direction 
- More capital investments in one region, all other variables being constant, will lead 
to a decrease in the return to capital in that same region 
 
The first three predictions are considered in chapter 3, while the fourth is discussed in 
Chapter 4. In this chapter, a description of the demographics of the OECDs will be given, by 
use of examples from Norway.  An introduction to the debate on different pension systems 
and a description of the Norwegian petroleum Fund, which might be an instrument for 
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Norway to handle the forthcoming challenge to meet future pensioners’ consumption needs, 
are given.  
 
 
2.1  The demographic situation for the OECD  
 
The OECD countries are experiencing a decrease in the ratio of the number of workers to 
the number of elderly. What may be more surprising is that also developing countries will 
experience such an increase, despite the relatively high population growth rates in many of 
these countries. The increase will be moderate in the least developed countries, and they will 
not in the next fifty years to come reach the nowadays level for more developed regions 
(UN, 2003). Diagram 1 shows this tendency. For the more developed and less developed 
regions the rate of people above 60 to total population will almost triple until 2050. 
Diagram 1 Number of people above 60 years to the total population  
 
When the rate of elderly to the total population increases national public pension schemes 
will experience an increased burden to pay pensions. The increased burden is caused by: 
• Higher claims due to the increased number of retired people 
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• Fewer people to pay the claims 
 
Diagram 2 shows the increased claims while diagram 3 shows the decrease in number of 
workers to pay the pensions, for the case of Norway4.  
 
Diagram 2 Pension benefits required in Norway* 
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4 Tables drawn on the basis of SSB predictions. Appendix A describes their assumptions. 
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Diagram 3 Number of workers to total population of Norway 
 
 
As can be seen from diagram 3 the predicted percent of the population that is working 
will decrease, approaching 68.5 % for Norway in 2040. Comparing the Norwegian example 
where the ratio of workers to total population is approximately 69.5% to the mean value of 
the ratio of elderly to total population for more developed region shows that the demographic 
changes in Norway are less dramatic than the general level for more developed nations.  
It is evident, though, that the increased number of pensioners in Norway will lead to 
higher expenditures needed to pay pensions, and therefore a bigger burden on the working 
part of the population, at least as long as no reform of the pension system takes place. The 
Norwegian pension benefits are increased as the real wage increases. Productivity growth 
does not therefore provide a solution to this problem.  
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2.2 The pension debate 
 
It is widely accepted that the demographic development described in the last section 
constitutes a substantial challenge to the pension systems in all OECD countries.  There is, 
however, no unity as to whether or not the system should be changed from the most 
commonly used paygo system to a system based on pre-funding. Funded systems are 
different from paygo in the sense that each generation are supposed to build up piles of 
money or assets to pay for own pensions when they retire.5 Modigliani F., M. Ceprini and 
A.S. Muralidhar  (2000) argue that one should replace the current public paygo system in 
most countries today, with a fully funded scheme.  The argument is that funding increases 
saving, and saving in financial assets give a higher rate of return than the sum of population 
and productivity growth.6 This will then lead to lower contributions needed in the future. 
They propose a shift from the paygo system to a fully funded system for the United States. 
They argue that the fully funded system is more cost effective in the sense that it requires 
smaller contributions for a given set of benefits. Different fixed rents on capital are assumed 
in their study. When 5% rent is assumed, they argue that the required contribution in the 
funded system would be approximately 1/3 of that of the paygo system. In their opinion a 
funded system is more stable and financially resilient, resulting in a large accumulation of 
assets and thus makes a contribution to national saving. Their proposal is that all 
participants’ contributions be invested in one common highly diversified portfolio consisting 
of a share of US’ domestic production, that they call the US’ market portfolio.  
Others, e.g. Brooks (2000), argue that the relatively high return on capital that we have 
seen in the last century in the United States can not be seen as constituting common rule for 
future predictions. The U.S. has in recent years experienced declining rates of return and the 
capital market of Japan, and other countries have experienced recessions. Robin Brooks 
(2000) uses an overlapping generation model to show that changes in the age distribution 
have significant impact on financial markets. He demonstrates that returns on savings for 
members of large birth cohorts (e.g. 1945-50) will be substantially lower than for other, 
smaller cohorts.   
                                                 
5 Two main groups of funded schemes are the defined benefit schemes and the defined contribution schemes, respectively. 
The defined benefit system is a state-led or private system where, as the name suggests, the benefits received when retired is 
defined. The contributions paid when working are then figured from expected returns. The defined contribution system is 
either state-led or private, contributions are decided and benefits will be counted from returns of the system. 
6 In a paygo scheme, the value growth of the system is the sum of population growth and productivity growth 
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Whereas Brooks is arguing within a closed economy, Holzmann (1999) is including the 
World as a whole in his statement. Without further discussion he concludes:  “the non-
synchronised ageing between developed and developing countries could provide higher 
returns for the one and higher capital formation for the other”.  
The next chapters contain an analysis as to whether the statement by Holzmann, as is 
evidently the case for Brook’s arguments, can be shown to be valid in the context of a neo-
classical tradition. The possibility that the non-synchronised ageing between the developed 
and developing countries could cause integration that results in higher returns to developed 
countries and higher capital formation for developing countries than in the absence of such 
integration will be the starting point for most of the analysis in this thesis, and we leave it for 
the discussion in the next chapters. 
In addition to the claim that return to capital may fall, Modigliani et al’s view has been 
met by another main argument.7 Orzag and Stiglitz (1999) and Nicholas Barr (2000) stress 
the centrality of output. They make the point that pensioners are not interested in piles of 
money, but consumption.  
Barr’s illustration goes as follows: If pensioners build up piles of money for future 
consumption, the desired pensioner consumption in the next period will exceed desired 
saving by workers. This results in price inflation and reduced purchasing power for 
pensioners. If, on the other hand, pensioners have accumulated non-money assets, the 
pensioners’ desired asset sales exceed desired asset purchases by workers. This results in 
reduced asset prices and hence reduced pensions. 
Barr (2000) states that in either outcome, the pensioners do not get what they expect, and 
the funded schemes face similar problems to paygo. The reasons are the same: shortage of 
output. Further he claims that the only difference is that the process is less transparent in 
funded schemes, and that a reason for advocating the funded system might be that politicians 
like bad news be seen to arise through market outcomes rather than political decisions. 
The only way a transition to a funded system can meet the challenges of today’s pension 
schemes is then, according to Barr (2000) and Stiglitz and Orzag (1999), through an increase 
in output.  
The question then is whether or not a transition to a funded system can increase output. 
To answer this question, two new questions have to be answered: 
• Does pre-funding increase saving? 
                                                 
7 The two arguments are related, and can be said to be only two ways to express the same point, in a closed economy 
14 
• Does saving increase output? 
 
The answer to the first question might be yes or no depending on whether or not savings 
for pensions crowd out other savings. If the theory of strong Ricardian equivalence holds, 
pre-funding will not increase savings. Barr (2000) argues that there is no robust evidence 
that a switch to a funded system increases saving in any country except for the US, and he 
also claims that the US’ evidence is not very robust.  
Whether or not saving increases output is a broad debate that touches the difference 
between theories with demand side focus and supply side focus respectively. The Keynesian 
approach that has a demand side focus, argues that increased saving will reduce output, 
while the neoclassical approach, with supply side focus, will argue that increased savings 
increase output in the coming period. As already mentioned the framework used in this 
thesis is the neoclassical and therefore we will assume that saving increases output in an 
economy. 
An issue that is not explicitly discussed in any of the two papers, Barr (2000) and Stiglitz 
and Orzag (1999), is the difference between domestic and foreign pre-funding. Whether or 
not domestic pre-funding will meet the challenges of future consumption needs will for 
certain relay on whether or not output increases. If a pension fund is invested in foreign 
markets, though, future consumption of pensioners does not necessarily relay on domestic 
output. If pensioners have preferences also for traded goods, consumption can be higher than 
production. This issue will be discussed in chapter 3 and 4, and therefore the points made in 
this section will relay on domestic pre-funding. 
Orzag and Stiglitz stress that a discussion of whether or not a funded system is better than 
paygo is different from the discussion of whether or not a transition to a funded system is 
preferable to paygo. The transition to a funded system will lead to what is called a double 
burden for one generation. This means that one working generation has to pay for both the 
pensioners when they still work and their own pension after retirement. That is one of the 
reasons why Norway is an interesting example: The Norwegian Petroleum Fund, which will 
be returned to in next section, could be used to pay one of the burdens. If it is accepted that 
the Petroleum income should belong to all future Norwegian generations, that transition 
burden is then paid by all future generations.   
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2.3  The Norwegian Petroleum Fund 
 
The Government Petroleum Fund (PF) was established in 1990. The act relating to the PF 
is Act of June 22, 1990 no 36. The two main purposes of the Fund are the following 
(Finansdepartementet, 1990): 
• Act as a buffer to smooth short term variation in the oil revenues 
• Serve as a tool for coping with the financial challenges connecting to an ageing 
population and the eventual decline in oil revenues, by transferring wealth to future 
generations 
 
The first part of the last purpose is the focus in the rest of this thesis, namely the aim of 
using the PF to serve the consumption needs of the ‘boom’ of elderly retiring.  
Although the Fund was established in 1990, no transfer was done until 1996. The first 
transfer to the Petroleum Fund was made for the 1996 fiscal year and amounted to NOK 2 
billion. Today the income of the Fund is defined as the government’s net cash flow from 
petroleum activities plus the return on the PF’s capital and net financial transactions related 
to petroleum activities. The expenditures of the Fund are the transfers to the fiscal budget to 
finance the non-oil budget deficit.  
At the end of 2002 the Fund amounted to NOK 609 billion. The return on the fund is 
given in box 1. 
Box 1 Returns on the Norwegian Petroleum Fund* 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
period 
7.28 % 8.16 % 10.94 % 0.34 % -3.72 % -6.57 % 2.53 % 
(*) Numbers are taken from the Norwegian Central Bank’s yearly report 2002 (Norges Bank 2002). 
 
The Ministry of Finance is the manager of the Fund. In the Regulation on the 
Management of the Government Petroleum Fund of October 1997, the Ministry of Finance 
has delegated the responsibility for the operational management of the PF to the Central 
Bank of Norway. The Bank has guidelines from the Government and the Ministry of 
Finance, and the government informs the parliament regularly. The Ministry of Finance 
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decides a benchmark portfolio and risk limits, while the central bank carry out the 
investment strategy, have the responsibility of risk management, accounting and reporting 
and offer professional advice to the ministry. 
It is said in the regulation that the total fund has to be invested abroad. The arguments for 
this is the need to maintain and protect the fiscal budget as a management tool, the need for a 
diversified industry structure, i.e. avoid “Dutch disease” and the need to stabilize the 
Norwegian economy by avoiding pressure on the exchange rate and decrease in interest rates 
that might have happened if the fund was invested in domestic markets. 
Originally, the Fund was invested in line with the Central Bank’s foreign exchange 
reserves, i.e. in low-risk interest bearing securities. Today the fund also holds equities. Two 
arguments for this have been claimed: 
 
• Risk must be weighted against the expected returns. Stocks entail a higher risk of short-
term fluctuations in market value than bonds, but have historically provided a higher 
returns over time. 
• The returns on equities and bonds do not normally move together 
 
It is claimed that the Fund is well diversified although some parts of the world are not 
included in the benchmark portfolio. An overview picture of the benchmark portfolio is 
shown in diagram 4. 
Diagram 4 Overview of the benchmark portfolio  
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  The diagram shows a map of the benchmark portfolio. Norges Bank (2003). 
The PF is with only small exceptions invested in the OECD countries. Brazil, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan are the countries outside the OECD that is included. They, 
altogether, only share a few percent of the equity investments and less than one percent of 
the investments in bonds (Norges Bank, 2002).  
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3. Why do investments take place in capital 
abundant rather than in capital scarce countries? 
 
The waste of labour is by no means confined to rich industrial countries. It is 
considerably greater in poor agrarian countries. If the principles of international division of 
labour are to be applied, labour must either be transported towards capital (emigration), or 
capital must be transported towards labour (industrialisation). From the point of view of 
maximising the world income, the difference between these two ways is one of transport 
costs only, and may be assumed to be negligible. Emigration and resettlement would, 
however, present so many difficulties in immigration areas (and in emigration areas) that it 
cannot be considered feasible on a large scale. A very considerable part of the task will have 
to be solved by industrialisation. (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943) 
 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s paper on development for Eastern Europe expresses the idea of 
externalities on the demand side. The theory used in this chapter follows the neo-classical 
tradition and no externalities are assumed. The description of how the capital should move to 
poor countries, however, fits with the predictions from neo-classical models.  
Neo-classical models of production and international trade predict that return on capital is 
higher in capital scarce countries than in more capital abundant countries This holds under 
the assumption that there is not perfectly free trade with no specialisation, as in the HOS 
framework, where factor price equalization occurs.  
Economists following the neo-classical school have, as already mentioned, asked why 
capital does not flow from rich to poor countries, as the models predict. This is earlier 
referred to as the Lucas’ paradox.  
In this chapter the neo-classical production function and some of its predictions are 
presented. Possible explanations to the Lucas’ paradox are given with reference to some 
research in this area. Further, at the end of the chapter, the paradox is discussed within the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework for international trade.  
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3.1  The neo-classical production function 
 
The simplest general production function in the neo-classical tradition is given by: 
Box 2 The neoclassical production function 
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If Y measures a country’s total production, and if L and K is the number of labour units 
and capital units respectively, the GDP will increase as total labour force and/or total amount 
of capital, increase. As one of the amounts of inputs increases, though, the increase in total 
GDP increases less and less.8 If the same technology is assumed to be present in all 
countries, the same production functions will also apply to each of them. This will imply that 
the relative capital scarce country has a higher rate of return on capital than the more capital 
abundant country9, except the case with HOS trade that is mentioned earlier. In this simple 
framework, there are only two inputs: physical capital and labour. A rich country is 
characterised with a higher capital to labour ratio than a poor country, which implies that 
poorer countries have a higher return to capital than richer ones. 
Although rich countries have more capital relative to workers than poor countries, large 
capital flows from richer to poorer countries do not take place, as the Neoclassical 
                                                 
8 For the case of completeness, the Inada conditions could be added to the definition of the neoclassical production function. 
They state that if one of the factors approaches the amount of zero, the marginal productivity of that factor approaches 
infinity, and when one of the factors approaches the amount of infinity, the marginal productivity of that factor approaches 
zero.  
9 An example of a neo-classical production function is the Cobb-Douglas function βα LAKY = . L is labour in 
production, K is capital used in production, while Y is the Gross Domestic Product. Both α and β are parameter values 
between zero and one. The marginal product of capital equals the rent on capital:
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Production Function suggests. This is referred to as the Lucas’ paradox, named after the 
Chicago School economist, Robert E. Lucas. Lucas himself incorporated human capital, and 
pointed at the role of externalities and imperfect capital markets. He also suggested that the 
possibility of wage increase in the pre-colonies might have been the reason why the colonial 
powers did not invest in the colonies (Lucas, 1990). Other explanations have been given, e.g. 
Rodrik (1991), who points to the role of risks and policy uncertainty in developing countries. 
Risks, other production functions, and three of the four explanations given by Lucas 
himself, monopsony in the labour market, differences in human capital, and externalities are 
described below. 
 
3.1.1 Risks 
 
Dani Rodrik (1991), among others, points to the risks and policy uncertainties in 
developing countries. He claims that they work as a tax on investments, and even modest 
risks and uncertainties, can act as a large tax on capital investments. A simple model of 
possible risks of expropriation, or conflict that destroys the capital in the region, is explained 
in the following. In the case of conflict or expropriation, all capital is destroyed. 
Rodrik, however, allows for some capital to return to the investor also in the case of a 
conflict, but at an entry cost. 
 
3.1.1.1 A simple model with risks of expropriation 
 
q – probability of expropriation 
r* - the capital rent on the world market 
K – the amount of capital invested 
r – the rent on capital in the developing country 
 
A simplified model would be a world market where the risks to investments is set to zero, 
and another market, namely a poor country with a risk for a conflict, which destroys all the 
capital. A risk neutral investor would be indifferent as to where to invest, if the expected 
returns in the two areas are equal. 
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The investor is thus indifferent if: 
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Assume that the rent on the world market is 10%, and the probability of risk is 0.1. For 
the investor to be indifferent, the rent on capital in the developing country has to equal: 
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A 12.2% rent on capital will in this case make the investor indifferent. If the risk of 
expropriation is larger or if the investor is risk averse, the rent in the developing country has 
to be even higher. 
If we accept that developing countries tend to have higher risks and policy uncertainties, 
for example due to lack of institutional capacity and regulation, this might be an explanation 
to the Lucas’ paradox. 
 
3.1.2       Monopsony in the labour market  
 
Lucas is himself sceptical to the risk argument being the only explanation to the Lucas 
paradox. Before 1945 most of the poor countries were subject to European colonial political 
and economical leadership. The argument of risks and political uncertainty would then not 
be valid, as the colonial powers were themselves instrumental in influencing the risks. Even 
at that time, however, movement of capital between the rich countries and the colonies was 
very limited. Lucas suggests that investments would increase wages in the colony and a 
profit maximising colonial power would therefore under-invest.   
Moene (1998) set up a model discussing the possibility that this mechanism may also be 
present today. The monopsonist is no longer the colonial power, but the elite in the 
developing countries. His model is described below. 
There are two sectors of production, G and F. G uses labour only in production, while F 
uses both labour and capital. The total output in the economy is: 
 
(4) ),()( KLFLGY FG +=  
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G has decreasing returns to scale, and Moene interprets this as natural resource extraction. 
F is called industry and is assumed to have the same properties as the neoclassical 
production function in equation (1). Equation (7) shows that there is a constant amount of 
labour in this economy, and the whole labour force is fully utilised. 
What he describes as the elite in the poor country can decide the size of K. When this is 
decided, the wage is dependent on equilibrium in the labour market. Equilibrium in the 
labour market is characterised with equal marginal productivity of labour in each sector of 
production, and wage equal to this marginal productivity: 
 
(8) wKLFLLG FLF F =′=−′ ),()(   
 
From equation (6) we know that the cross derivative of production with regard to labour 
and capital in the F sector is positive. This implies that the higher the amount of K in the 
economy, the higher the wage: 
 
(9) )(Kww =  0)( >′ Kw  
 
The employment in the G sector will increase as w goes down, i.e. the less K the 
higher GL . This can be seen from (5) and (8). 
The opportunity cost of investing in the poor country is the world market rent on capital, 
r. 
The profit of investing in the poor country is thus given by: 
 
(10) rKLKwY −−= )(π  
 
The economic efficient amount of capital is given in equation (11) where the marginal 
productivity of capital equals the world market rent. 
23 
 
(11) rKLF FK =′ ),(    
 
Maximising (10) however, gives the optimal amount for the colonial investor: 
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The marginal productivity of capital has to be higher than the world market return, for an 
investor to invest in the poor country. 
Given that a monopsonist elite as assumed above is present in poor countries, this model 
explains the Lucas’ paradox. 
 
3.1.3       Human capital  
 
Another point made by Lucas, is the role of human capital in the production. If human 
capital, H, is incorporated in the production function, and capital and labour are assumed to 
produce more effectively the higher the H, this explains why capital is invested in rich 
countries rather than in developing countries. One example of a production function with this 
property is the Cobb Douglas production function: 
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The rent on capital will be given by: 
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We see that the rent on capital is higher the higher the H. This will be true for all 
production functions with positive cross derivative with regard to capital and human capital. 
In the Cobb Douglas case the cross derivative is equal to: 
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The fact that rich countries tend to have higher human capital may therefore be another 
explanation to the Lucas’ paradox.  
 
3.1.4       Externalities 
 
Positive externalities from capital or human capital are also used as explanations to the 
Lucas’ paradox. Lucas pointed at externalities from human capital. One possible way of 
showing this in the neoclassical production function is by including a technology parameter 
A, taken as given for each producer in the economy. If A is assumed to be a function of the 
total amount of capital (or human capital) in the economy, the externalities can be expressed 
in the following way: 
Assume each producer in the economy has a production function equal to: 
 
(17) αα −= 1iii LAKY  i = 1, 2, …, n 
 
Where iK and iL  is capital and labour, respectively, in firm i. 
The total production in the country will then be all the individual firms’ productions 
added together: 
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If all the n producers are of equal size, the total production is: 
 
(19) αα −= 1LAKY  
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An externality can be introduced by endogenizing A: 
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The production function for the whole economy can then be expressed as: 
 
(21) γαγα −−+= 1LKY  
 
where γK  expresses the positive external effect from capital. 
If an external effect of capital is present this will counteract the earlier point made, that 
capital scarce countries will have higher return on capital. Seen separately, the externality 
will cause higher return to capital in already capital abundant countries. The two effects will 
have opposite effects of the initial amount of capital in the economy, and the total effect on 
the rent of capital of being capital abundant could be negative, as without the externality, or 
positive. 
The return that the individual investor expects, while ignoring the external effect, ir , is 
given by: 
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When recognising that A is a positive function of K, the amount of K in the country will 
then have an unknown negative effect on ir . Using the above example of an A function the 
derivative of r  with respect to K is given by the second derivative of Y with respect to K: 
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Which is less, equal to, or larger than zero depending on whether or not the sum of the 
parameter values, α and γ , is larger than 1.  
One possible explanation to the Lucas’ paradox is that capital in itself has a positive 
external effect on the total production in an economy. 
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3.1.5       Other production functions 
 
Unquestionably, the theoretical neoclassical production function does not fit all the actual 
production procedures. For example, it might be the case that not all factors of production 
are fully utilised, as is assumed in the neoclassical framework.  
The example that will be given in this section is a production function where all factors of 
production are fully utilised, but the productivity of each worker is positively related to the 
productivity of each worker. The so-called O-Ring production function explained in Kremer 
(1993) is given by: 
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Where B is a constant, n is the number of tasks in the production process, and q is the 
quality of the work done in each task. The similarity with the neoclassical production 
function is not difficult to discover; the cross derivative of production with regard to K and n 
is positive. The difference, however, is that the better quality each worker has, or better the 
quality in each task of production, the better the marginal productivity from each worker’s or 
task’s quality. This is the opposite in the neoclassical function. An example of the kind of 
production process expressed in the O-ring function is one along an assembly line. 
If q’s interpretation is human capital, the similarity between this function and the 
neoclassical with human capital incorporated, is that higher human capital in the rich 
countries can explain why capital does not move from rich to poor countries. The effect of 
differences in human capital is much larger, though, in the O-Ring function. 
If there were some positive connection between q and K, for example because workers 
that are used to working with capital equipment and machinery does that in a more effective 
way than those not used to it, this explanation to the Lucas’ paradox would be even stronger. 
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3.2       The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework10 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade theory is a framework within the neo-
classical tradition. The production in each country consists of the output from two sectors of 
production. In the following these will be referred to as C and S, respectively. The 
production function for each of the two sectors is given by: 
 
(25) ),( LKFS S=  
(26) ),( LKFC C=           
 
The production functions satisfy the neo-classical assumptions presented in the previous 
section. They are also characterised by constant returns to scale (CRL). The goods produced 
in each sector will not be given any interpretation yet; the only necessary assumption is that 
the goods produced in one sector have the same production technology, and that consumers 
have common preferences for all goods in one sector. The two sectors, however, have 
different production technologies, and the C sector is assumed to be most capital intensive in 
production. 
Two countries will be considered, and we will divide the world into developed and 
developing regions. One country will be called O, symbolising the OECD countries, while 
the other country will be called D, symbolising the group of developing countries. The two 
factors of production, labour and capital, are perfectly mobile between sectors inside one 
country and perfectly immobile between countries. Homothetic preferences are assumed, i.e. 
the income elasticity is equal to one11 and consumers in both countries are assumed to have 
similar paths of homothetic preferences. 
                                                 
10 A more formal outlay of the HOS trade theory is given in appendix B 
11 This will imply that all consumers, although at different income levels, will have preferences for the same basket of 
goods. There is thus no “Engel effect”, i.e. that the richer people use larger shares of their budgets on luxury goods than 
poorer people do. See for example Mehlum (2003) for other preference assumptions. Homothetic functions are a monotone 
incr 
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It will be assumed that the OECD countries are relatively well equipped with capital than 
the developing regions. For the purpose of illustration, assume that no barriers to trade are 
present. The result will then be that the OECD country will export the capital intensive good 
and import the labour intensive good, while the opposite will be true for the developing 
country.  
Diagram 6 below shows the production possibility set (PPS) for the poor country and the 
relative price line, p, in autarky for this country. The PPS is concave because the two goods 
have different production technologies and the second derivatives of the production 
functions are less than one with regard to capital and labour respectively. We will later see 
that the slope of this country’s PPS is different from the slope of the rich country’s PPS; the 
poor country can produce more S goods relatively to C goods due to the fact that the country 
is a capital scarce country. The intersection with the axes shows the output of this country 
measured in S and C goods respectively.  
The indifference curve drawn is one for a “representative consumer”. The assumption 
necessary to draw this curve is that it is possible to aggregate consumers in such a way that 
all consumers’ preferences could be illustrated by one set of indifference curves. The 
assumption of homothetic preferences ensures this. The indifference curve that is tangent to 
the PPS will ensure efficiency both in consumption and in production; a point inside the PPS 
will not use all that is produced (unexploited gains) and a point outside this is not possible 
because of the production possibilities. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
easing function of a function that is homogenous of degree one. They are illustrated by drawing indifference curves that all 
have the same steepness in each point that make a linear curve that crosses origo.   
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Diagram 5 Production possibility set and autarky prices for the poor country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The OECD is relatively, and absolutely, more capital abundant, and therefore the PPS of 
the OECD less steep, for any given value of C. Diagram 6 shows one possible illustration of 
the PPS for the OECD and the relative price line in autarky for this country. 
 
 
Diagram 5 shows the production possibilities (PPS) for the poor country; it is concave, indicating that 
there are substitution possibilities between the factors of production in the two sectors. The PPS’s 
intersection with the horizontal and vertical axes gives the production in the poor country given in C goods 
and S goods respectively. All point on and inside the PPS are possible production points, but optimality in 
production will imply that the production point is on the PPS. The consumers’ preferences can be shown 
by convex indifference curves, indicating that consumers prefer some of both goods compared to just 
consuming one of the goods. The preference direction is northeast in the diagram, indicating that more 
goods are always better, all other things equal. The optimal possible consumption point will then be the 
one where one of the indifference curves is tangent to the PPS. This indifference curve is called U in the 
diagram. The slope in this optimal point for both consumption and production, gives the negative of the 
relative price level, 
S
C
P
P− . 
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Diagram 6 Production possibility set and relative prices in autarky for the OECD 
 
 
 
 
 
By putting these two figures together one can find the relative price line for the world-
integrated equilibrium, i.e. when all gains from trade are exploited. This is done in diagram 
7. 
The U and the PPS has the same interpretation as in Diagram 3.1. The price line, P, has the slope of the 
negative of the autarky price level in the OECD. The PPS of the OECD country is less steep than the one for the 
poor country, indicating that the OECD is more capital abundant and resting on the assumption that the C goods 
are relative more capital intensive in production. 
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Diagram 7 Integrated equilibrium, world market relative prices 
 
 
 
Because of the assumption of homothetic preferences, it is possible to draw the 
indifference curve for a representative ‘world consumer’ that is tangent to the PPS of the 
world. 
We see that the relative price line for the integrated world market is not as steep as in the 
poor country, but steeper than the price line of the rich country. A more formal description of 
the integrated equilibrium compared to the autarky situations is given in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
 
 
 
The PPS in diagram 7 is constructed as if the two countries were one common country, and the factors of 
production in the whole world give the production possibilities drawn here. With perfectly free trade, the 
optimal consumption - and production point is the tangent point between U and the worlds PPS. The slope of 
P* gives the negative of the relative world market prices, 
S
C
P
P− . 
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Box 3 Assumptions in the HOS framework 
 
HOS assumptions: 
• 2x2x2 model; two countries, two goods and two factors of production 
• Constant returns to scale (CRS) production functions, the same technology in both 
countries 
• No factor intensity reversals 
• No specialisation 
• Homothetic preferences, equal in both countries 
• Factors of production perfectly mobile between sectors and perfectly immobile between 
countries 
• No barriers to trade in commodity markets 
 
 
The following section will adopt all the assumptions listed in box 3, while section 3.2.2 
relaxes the two last assumptions. 
 
3.2.1       Free trade in Commodity Markets 
 
The situation considered in this section is one with immobile factors of production while 
the commodities are perfectly mobile and can be traded without costs. As long as there is no 
perfect specialisation in the post-trade equilibrium, the relative commodity prices after trade 
will be equal in both countries and lie in the interval between the two pre-trade autarky 
prices. Assuming that the poor country is relatively labour abundant, this will be given by 
the relation: 
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Top-print A indicates the autarky prices and footprint O and D represents the developing- 
and the OECD countries, respectively. The autarky price levels are shown in diagram 8. 8a 
shows the possible aggregate production and consumption levels, while 8b shows the per 
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capita levels of production and consumption respectively. The relative price levels, i.e. the 
slope of the O and E curves, are equal in the two diagrams. 
 
 
Diagram 8 Production and utility in O and D 
 
Diagram 8a shows the PPS for the OECD and the poor country in the same diagram, and the 
two autarky price lines. Diagram 8b shows the production possibilities per capita. We see that the 
poor country consumer reaches a lower utility level (u2) than the OECD country consumer (u5). 
This gives a justification for calling it the poor country. 
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In both diagrams the slopes of the two straight lines named O and D show the relative price 
levels in the poor and the rich country respectively. The slope of the O-line is equal to 
A
OC
S
P
P
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−  and the slope of the D-curve is equal to 
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DC
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P
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⎛− .  
The additional information we get from the per capita diagram is that each consumer in 
the rich country reaches a higher utility level than the consumers of the poor country. This is 
a result of the definition of a rich country, which is that it has more capital per labour unit 
than poor countries.  
The illustration points out the fact that the production possibility set (PPS) for the poor 
country has a steeper slope, in general, than the richer country’s PPS. The reason for this is 
the higher capital/worker ratio in the rich country. The way the PPS’s are drawn indicates 
that the rich country has more capital in both absolute and relative terms than the poor 
country, while the poor country has more labour. This is not very unrealistic, as we know 
that most people in the world today live in developing countries while most of the capital 
(both financial and physical) is situated in the OECD. 
Due to homothetic and similar preference paths in the two countries, we can draw the 
indifference curves in this diagram and let them represent the preferences for consumers in 
both countries. It follows from the figure that the relative price level in autarky for the poor 
country is lower than the relative price level in the rich country. This is due to the difference 
in relative factor abundance. 
The curves illustrate that: 
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We know that none of the countries’ post-trade production is fully specialised and we can 
find the world market relative prices as we did in the last chapter, by drawing the world’s 
PPS and the representative consumer’s indifference curves. As already mentioned, the post 
trade world market price will then lie between the two autarky price levels.   
The gains from trade stem from the fact that the consumption possibilities are no longer 
restricted by the PPS, but of the post-trade relative price line. When the new world market 
price line is drawn in the figure, as in diagram 7, we see that the utility levels in each country 
are higher than in autarky.   
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Diagram 9 Post-trade prices, production and utility levels 
 
 
 
We see from the consumption point for each of the two countries that the consumers 
reach a higher utility level after trade compared to the pre-trade situation. The gains from 
trade is due to the fact that in the post-trade situation consumers can choose a consumption 
point outside the PPS of their own country. 
The reason why the consumption point is found as in diagram 9 is given in the following. 
The world market prices are found from the knowledge of both the world’s production 
The slopes of the green price lines of diagram 9 are equal and found from the world price line in diagram 7. 
The indifference curves show that free international trade allows higher utility levels for consumers in both 
countries. The actual consumption point lies on an indifference curve northeast of the indifference curve tangent 
to the PPS of the respective country. We also see that the countries specialise the production, not fully, but they 
tend to produce more of the good that are intensive in the use of the factor that the country is relatively well 
endowed with. 
The utility for the representative consumer is higher for the poor country than for the rich. The poor country 
representative consumer, however, represents more people than the rich country representative consumer, and 
the ‘per consumer utility’ in the poor country can therefore be lower than the rich country consumer utility. This 
fact is illustrated in diagram 8. 
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possibilities and the world’s consumption preferences. World market prices are decided so 
that: 
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Where post trade world market prices have top-print * and footprints denote respectively 
consumption (C) and production (P). 
If we assume that trade is balanced between the two countries, it will also be true that: 
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Where i = D, O 
The left side expresses country i’s total income. Let *)( iPC  and *)(
i
PS  denote i’s 
production of the two commodities in the after trade equilibrium. The income, I , will then 
be expressed as follows: 
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i
PC =+ )*(**)(*  
 
S and C with top-print * are the production levels in the point on the PPS tangent to the 
post-trade relative price line, and I  is the resulting income level for the country in 
consideration. The income level in each country depends on the country’s endowment of 
production factors, the consumers’ preferences, and the other country’s factor endowment. 
A country exposed to international trade has a consumption possibility set (CPS) outside 
its own PPS. In opposite to the autarky situation, the consumption constraint is now given by 
the income defined above and not entirely by own production. The income level constrains 
the consumption and defines a new CPS.  
The value of the consumption has to equal the income: 
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Implicit derivation with respect to iCC  gives: 
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This gives us the slope of the CPS in the diagram 8: 
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We see from this that the CPS has a slope equal to the relative price line. We then only 
need one possible consumption point to identify the CPS in the diagram. The production 
point obviously has to be a possible point for consumption. The consumption constraint is 
then given by the line through the equilibrium production point with slope of the negative of 
relative world market prices. 
The PPS tangent that has a slope equal to the relative price on the world market then 
defines the consumption constraint. The optimal consumption point will then be the point 
where one of the indifference curves is tangent to this CPS. 
 
3.2.2       The S sector produces non-traded goods 
 
In this section the discussion continues within the HOS-framework, but one of the 
commodities is assumed to be non-traded, as it was in Mundell (1957). The assumption is 
that the non-traded goods are S goods, and they are interpreted as services.  
The other sector can be interpreted as, for example, manufacturing. For simplicity, 
services are assumed to be totally immobile between countries, while manufactures can be 
traded without costs. These assumptions can be proved to be wrong; in reality some services 
can be traded and some manufactures are costly to get from one country to another. These 
assumptions might, however, have some root in reality. Services are often produced at the 
consumption point. Health and care services, for example, are not possible to send from one 
country to another without moving either workers towards the consumption point or the 
consumers towards the production point. Manufactures, by contrast, can most often be 
produced in one country and bought by consumers in another country. 
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Obviously, times have changed in this respect with the remarkable improvements in 
information technology during the last decades. It is now possible to make use of the Internet 
to send information services from one country to another. In fact, it might be claimed that 
services are less costly to transfer from one country to another than manufactured products. 
This point is ignored here, but will be returned to in chapter 4. 
An argument for assuming that services are less tradable than commodities, is that they 
may differ from country to country. Services might have more specific national 
characteristics than manufactured goods. Health and care services, for example, are easier 
consumed when both producers and consumers have the same cultural background, 
language, and habits. Information services, although transported at low cost, might be easiest 
to produce in the country where it is to be consumed, where producers have the knowledge 
of the preferences and needs of consumers and the know-how on infrastructure. The 
discussion of the non-traded feature of the service sector is continued in chapter 4. 
From the literature in the HOS tradition (e.g. Mundell 1957) it is said that factor mobility 
and free trade in the commodity markets are substitutes. If both capital and labour were 
mobile between countries, there would be no need for trade in C and S commodities. Then 
each country’s production point could be at the consumption points shown in diagram 10, 
without any trade present. The price and utility level would then equal the free trade 
equilibrium even in the absence of trade in the goods market. If only one of the factors of 
production is mobile, however, trade in one of the commodities also have to be present to 
reach this point. 
Let us now study the two different situations in turn, both in which the S sector is non-
traded. The first situation with mobile labour is technically similar to the illustrated example 
in Mundell (1957). The other situation discusses a situation with mobile capital, and the 
illustration and discussion of whether or not the factor mobility is a substitute for trade in S-
commodities will be somewhat different from the first case. The framework here is static, 
which means that we assume that there is no time lag from the movement of labour or capital 
investment takes place till the actual production appears. 
 
3.2.2.1 Labour mobility, free migration 
 
Let us assume that the OECD countries accept free immigration, and that the labour force 
in the third world is totally rootless, moving wherever the wage is higher. Further, let us 
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assume for now that the labour moving to the OECD still belongs to the third world in the 
sense that their payment is returned to the poor country, and the labour sited in the OECD 
still consumes in the third world countries.  
The flow of labour from the poor to the rich country will cause a shift in the PPS in both 
countries. The PPS of the rich country moves northeast in the diagram. The shift creates a 
larger vertical than horizontal distance along the axes to the ‘old’ PPS curve. The reason for 
this is that the S industry is relatively more labour intensive than the C industry. The 
opposite is true for the poor country. The PPS curve moves southwest in the diagram, and 
the negative shift is also larger in the vertical than in the horizontal direction. 
The slope of the two countries’ PPSs is getting more similar; the rich country gets a better 
chance to produce S commodities, and the poor country is paid for the ‘labour-loan’ in C 
products. The countries get the same output and consumption as in the free trade 
equilibrium. Diagram 11 shows the rich country’s PPS and the amount of C goods that they 
send to the poor country to repay the labour loan.  
 
Diagram 10 Production and consumption in OECD after labour immigration 
 
 The new PPS drawn in diagram 11 lies northeast of the ‘old’ PPS. The new labour that comes to the country 
expands the production possibilities. The expansion is larger for the S goods than the C goods due to the fact that S 
goods uses labour more intensively in production. As long as the migrating labour is assumed to consume in its home 
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We know that since the S sector is non-traded, the consumption of S goods must equal the 
production of S goods in each of the two countries. 
We now have the consumption possibility set defined as: 
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I  is the income of the country defined from production, own endowment is given by the 
PPS before the labour movement, and world market prices in world equilibrium. iPS  is the 
production of S goods in equilibrium. The consumption of C goods is found by finding the 
tangent to the PPS before the capital movement that has a slope equal to the relative prices in 
equilibrium after the labour movement, and find the point on this tangent where S equals the 
produced level of S in the economy. 
CΔ has to return to the poor country. The reason for this is that the labour should be paid, 
and the consumption point of the OECD must lie on the curve representing the income from 
trade with slope 
*
*
S
C
P
P− .  
The labour force is far from mobile between poor and rich countries. This is due to 
political regulations in the OECD , as well as to travelling costs. In addition, people 
sometimes seem to be of an immobile nature; most people are not willing to leave their home 
countries.  
There is also a question to be asked about the homogeneity of labour in different 
countries. Differences in culture, language, schooling and knowledge are some of the aspects 
that might make the labour force different. I will return to a discussion of these and related 
aspects in chapter 4. 
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3.2.2.2 Capital mobility 
 
The next situation to study is a world where capital is perfectly mobile between countries, 
while labour is immobile. This may be a situation closer to the real world, especially if we 
consider financial capital to be the factor of production. Trying to illustrate the capital flow 
in the same way as done in last section, the model would predict a flow of capital from the 
rich country to the poor, and a repayment in S goods.  
 
Diagram 11 Capital movement from OECD to D, PPS for the developing countries 
 
 
 
 
ΔS should be sent as repayment to the rich country. The S goods are immobile between 
countries, though, and the repayment is impossible. The situation described in diagram 11, 
Diagram 11 shows the same effect of capital mobility that was shown for labour mobility in diagram 10. The 
assumption here must be that S-goods are tradable, so that the capital owners in the OECD can get their payment for the 
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will not occur. This is a point not mentioned in Mundell’s article. He argues that the two are 
substitutes, and show this by one example. Steel is then not freely traded, but capital is. Steel 
is relatively capital intensive in production, and his result is then the same as the first case 
shown here, and illustrated in diagram 11.  
The prediction from this model is, however, that the capital would flow into the poor 
country till the poor country was more capital abundant than the rich country, and send 
capital intensive goods back as repayment.12 
This can be illustrated in an edgeworth box, as done in diagram 12. 
 
Diagram 12 Edgeworth box with capital mobility and a non-traded good 
 
 
Diagram 12 illustrates an example of an initial situation at point E where the rich country 
is endowed with relatively more capital than the poor country. The labour intensive good is 
assumed to be non-traded, while the capital intensive good can be traded without cost. The 
capital will then move to the poor country, and in an amount such that the rich country 
becomes less capital abundant than the poor country. The capital movement is illustrated 
with the blue vector from E to P, and P is the production point. The repayment to the rich 
                                                 
12 This argumentation can be found in Venables and Norman (1995) 
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country for the capital loan comes in capital intensive goods, illustrated by the green vector 
from P to C. The slope of this vector illustrates the factor content of production of C-goods. 
The preference direction for the poor country is northeast in the box, while the preference 
direction for the rich country is southwest. The indifference curves for both countries are 
convex. In the consumption point, C, both economies have reached a higher utility level than 
in E. 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) expressed capital movements to one region as industrialisation 
of that same region (i.e. the reference in the beginning of this chapter). Using this 
terminology, the above expressed technical situation will lead to industrialisation of the poor 
country in the world and a deindustrialisation of the OECD countries. For certain, these large 
movements of capital are not observed. So the paradox regarding capital movements might 
not only be that poor countries are not industrialised, but also that the industrial countries are 
not deindustrialised. 
A reformulation of the Lucas paradox might in this case be necessary: 
 
If the labour intensive goods are less tradable than the capital intensive goods, capital is 
mobile and labour is immobile between countries, the prediction from this model should 
be that capital moves to the developing countries to the extent that as a result the poor 
countries have relatively more capital than the rich countries. These flows of capital are 
not observed. 
 
If one accepts that deindustrialisation of the industrialised countries will not happen, 
because of political-, technical- or other constraints, one have to argue outside the model. 
But if such a constraint is apparent, the model, and figure 12, shows that the possibility that 
labour intensive goods tend to be less tradable than capital intensive goods should be added 
to the discussion of the Lucas’ paradox. 
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4. Two small countries, one rich and one poor 
 
The situation considered in this chapter, is one with two small countries, one that is rich 
and one that is poor. As shown by equation (39) the world market is assumed to be more 
capital scarce than the rich country, but more capital abundant than the poor country. 
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P indicates the poor country, W indicates the world market, and R indicates the rich 
country. 
According to the neoclassical production function this will lead to the highest rent on 
capital in the poor country, the intermediate rate at the world market, and the return on 
capital will be smallest in the rich country. 
The situation regarded in this chapter is similar to the one in the previous section in many 
ways: There are two sectors of production, S and C, there are two factors of production, L 
and K and, finally, the production functions have the neoclassical properties. The initial 
situation is that C goods and capital are mobile between the countries, while S goods and 
labour are immobile. According to the discussion in the last chapter, trade between the rich 
and the poor country will not occur in the initial situation. Trade might occur, however, if 
either labour or S goods were mobile between the two countries. 
A new source of income for the rich country is introduced, for which no inputs are used in 
production. This resource rent can be used to buy traded goods at the world market or it can 
be invested in the poor or the rich country and transformed into physical capital. 
The rich country faces a demographic situation similar to the one described for the OECD 
countries in chapter 1. The government has, therefore, decided to save and invest some of the 
present income from the natural resource, for future consumption needs. Norway is the rich 
country example, and the investment decision will therefore be regarded as the Norwegian 
Government’s decision on how to invest the Norwegian Petroleum Fund (PF). 
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The world market interpretation will be the OECD countries, or more precise, similar to 
the benchmark portfolio of the PF today. The portfolio that the PF is invested in today will 
thus be called a world market portfolio investment. 
The government has four different possibilities: 
 
• Invest in own country  
• Invest in a world market portfolio 
• Invest in the poor country 
• Open up for free migration 
 
There are two important questions to be asked before the investment decision is made, 
both of them mentioned in the introduction.  
The first is the main question that appears to be important in each of the alternative 
possibilities above:  
Can the PF be transformed into goods that fit the future consumption needs of an ageing 
population?  
The second important question that applies to investment possibility one and two 
respectively, is whether the coming transformation of the pension schemes in the OECD-
countries will lead to lower rents on capital in this area. 
There is now assumed a time lag from the investments or factor movements take place till 
the effect on production occurs. Two time periods will be regarded; the first is when the 
decision is made and either the investment or the migration takes place, while the other is 
when the effect on production or import occurs.    
In the following, the four different investment possibilities will be discussed in turn. 
 
 
4.1 Invest in own country 
If the fund had been invested in own country, the PPS for period two would shift out and 
lie northeast in the diagram compared to the PPS without the investment.13 The intersection 
                                                 
13 The PPS in period two without effects from the fund is assumed to equal to the period one PPS throughout this chapter. 
This is only for simplicity, and the challenge facing the period two consumers may than be regarded as there are more of 
them to share the same production as before. 
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with both axes shift due to the fact that capital is a factor of production in both the S and the 
C sector. The relative shift along the S axes is, however, smaller than the relative shift along 
the C axes due to the fact that C goods uses capital more intensively in production.  
 
Diagram 13 Invest in own country 
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If the shift in the PPS had been larger northwest than northeast in the diagram, the utility 
would increase more than shown in diagram 13. Another way to say this is that if the 
petroleum income could be transformed into labour units in period two, the utility increase 
from the petroleum income would be larger. 
When capital is invested in the most capital intensive country it is also invested in the 
country where the rent on capital is lowest, according to the neoclassical production 
function. So, one would believe, that if other investment possibilities are present, it would be 
profitable to choose one of the other possibilities. The logic behind this is that the rich 
country already produces C goods in a large amount compared to the poor country and the 
world market.  
Further the wage is higher the larger the rate of capital to labour in the economy. In 
Norway it has been discussed during the 90s that the wage rate is high, and perhaps to high, 
due to the income from the petroleum sector. Other countries have after a period of high 
incomes from natural resources experienced a decline in the competitiveness in other 
industries, and with the disappearance of this income, these countries’ income has declined 
The investment in own country is, according to the neoclassical model, more profitable the less capital 
abundant the country is. We see from the figure that the production possibilities increase relatively more for the 
capital intensive good than for the less capital intensive good. Then it will also be the case that the more 
consumers tend to prefer C goods to S goods, the more profitable the investment. 
 
C  
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dramatically. This is called the Dutch disease argument, named after the situation in Holland 
during the 1980s and -90s after large incomes from the gas sector were put into the economy 
and the flow of income disappeared.14 If the capital were invested in Norway, the wages 
would increase even further. As already mentioned in chapter 2, it is said in the regulation of 
the PF that the total fund has to be invested abroad. The argument for this is to avoid further 
pressure in the economy:15 
 
(…) the need to maintain and protect the fiscal budget as a management tool, the need for a 
diversified industry structure, i.e. avoid “Dutch disease”, and the need to stabilize the 
Norwegian economy by avoiding pressure on the exchange rate and decrease in interest 
rates that might have happened if the fund was invested in domestic markets. (Ministry of 
Finance, 1990) 
 
In the next session we will return to a discussion of the world market portfolio 
investment, the investment option chosen today.  
 
4.2 Invest in a world market portfolio 
 
The PF is today, as discussed in chapter 2, invested in a world market portfolio. It is 
therefore important to ask whether a world market portfolio investment can be transformed 
into consumption needed in the following periods. Second, the expected return on the world 
market portfolio, in a period when many countries are expected to build up similar funds, has 
to be discussed. 
The PPS for period two describes, as before, the production possibilities when all capital 
and labour in the economy is fully utilized. The capital in the economy is the amount of 
capital the economy has without using any of the saved money on capital equipment. This 
might be assumed to be the same capital that the country had in period one, i.e. the domestic 
savings was equal to the capital depreciation in period one.  
When the savings from period two have been invested in a world market portfolio, the 
PPS will be unaffected. The Consumption possibility set (CPS) though, will not be given by 
                                                 
14 Bergo J. (2003): ”Oljen – utfordringer for den økonomiske politikken”, Foredrag på Sørlandskonferansen 2003 
15 Author’s translation from Norwegian 
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the PPS, but have an overall horizontal distance from the PPS equal to the fund’s value in 
terms of traded goods. The fund’s value will equal the sum of savings from period one and 
capital rents given at the world market. 
 
Diagram 14 World market portfolio investment16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intersection with the vertical axes is the same for the PPS and CPS. This is due to the 
fact that the fund and its returns can only be used at the world market, and the only tradable 
good is C-goods. If one tried to buy S-goods for the fund and its returns, the only effect, 
except the distributional, would be inflation.17 If a certain group, for example pensioners, 
                                                 
16 The analysis here has some similarities to Holden (1999), where structural effects from petroleum income and Dutch 
Disease arguments are discussed.  
17 It will be consumed more S goods after the fund is put into the economy, because the structural change indicates that less 
C goods and more S goods are produced in the economy. 
Diagram 14 shows the second period PPS and consumption possibilities for the rich country if investment in 
period one is done at the world market, and put into the economy in period two. The horizontal distance from the 
PPS and the consumption possibilities are always equal to the value of the fund and its returns accounted in C-goods. 
The intersection with the second axes is the same for the PPS and CPS. This is due to the fact that the fund and its 
returns can only be used at the world market, and the only tradable good there is C-goods. If one tried to buy S-
goods for the fund and its returns, the only effect, except the distributional, would be inflation. If a certain group for 
example pensioners received the fund and its returns, they would only exclude other consumers. The reason for this 
is that all resources are fully utilised in this economy.  
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received the fund and its returns, and wanted to buy S goods only, they would exclude other 
S goods consumers. The reason for this is that all resources are fully utilised in this 
economy.  
The yellow arrow indicates the reduction in own production of C goods in period two, 
while the blue arrow indicates the increased consumption of C goods in period two. The pink 
arrow indicates the increased production and consumption of S goods in period two.  
The result from the investment at the world market will not only result in a change in the 
consumption in period two, but also a change in production: Less traded goods and more 
services will be produced in Norway. The Dutch disease argument will then also be present 
here: A structural change in production involving a change towards production of labour 
intensive goods will lead to what can be called “a higher scarcity in the already scarce 
factor”, labour. The wage will then rise and the competitiveness in other industries than 
petroleum thus decreases.18 If the petroleum income disappears in later periods, the country 
will experience a decrease in income, and consumption of traded goods.    
The diagram shows that the portfolio investments will give a higher utility in period two 
than the case with no saving. We see that the country’s production structure changes, the 
manufacturing production decreases, while the service production increase. Consumption of 
both goods increases. 
As is seen from the figure, the more the preferences tend to choose services than traded 
goods, the less is probably the utility increase from putting the fund into the economy in 
period two, for example in the form of pension payments.19  
Norway is one of few countries that have tried to calculate the amount of traded goods 
relative to non-traded goods in consumption. In 1989  75% of GDP was in non-traded goods 
while the rest was traded goods (Norman, 1993).20 
It is reasonable to assume that the elderly part of the population consumes services like 
health care and social care to a larger extent than the rest of the population. When the rate of 
elderly to the younger part of the population increases, it will then also be reasonable to 
assume that the preferences of the representative consumer will move towards non-traded 
goods. This discussion goes outside the model used here, where homothetic preferences is 
                                                 
18 Crucial to this argument is the two-period framework in use here. If the time horizon was unlimited, and the fund was set 
aside to give the country a permanent flow of income for the future, the wage increase would then be much smaller and be 
permanent and therefore cause no problem. 
19 The utility concept is not cardinal as discussed before, so it is actually not possible to compare changes in utility in 
different preference regimes.  
20 In 1995 the National Accounting procedure was changed and the country no longer gives statistics of this. Rødseth (2000) 
explains that the distinction between traded and non-traded goods is not evident. 
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assumed, but this tendency will probably lead to a smaller shift in the utility curve, which 
will be important in comparison with the other alternatives.  
The answer to the first question regarding whether or not the PF investment will make the 
consumption needed in period two available, will then be:  
The more preferences tend to prefer S goods to C goods; the utility increase from 
increased consumption possibilities for C goods will be less than utility increase from 
increased consumption possibilities for S goods. 
The second question about whether or not the expected change in pension schemes for 
most OECD countries from paygo to funded schemes, will result in the returns on the fund 
being smaller than expected, i.e. the horizontal distance from the PPS to the CPS in diagram 
14 being smaller than expected. 
The answer from the theory is clear; if funding increases savings at the world market, the 
rent on capital will decrease, and the horizontal distance between the PPS and the CPS will 
decrease as the savings at the world market increase. 
The negative returns for 2001 and 2002 for the PF stem from a far too short period to say 
that it is a result of decreasing returns on capital. The argument that this is only an outcome 
of business cycles seems obvious.21  
However, some, i.e. the famous speculator George Soros, argues that we face a period of 
depression in the Western economies and that it is time to focus on other potential growth 
engines. He argues that these growth engines could be the third world countries (Soros, 
2001). What supports his view within the neoclassical models is the prediction that increased 
savings in the OECD, or increased funding as long as it leads to increased savings, leads to 
lower returns. It is nothing in the theory, however, that would predict negative returns. 
 
 
4.3 Invest in the poor country 
 
As shown in chapter 3, capital investments in the poor country may not happen in a 
situation where services are non-traded and labour is immobile between countries. In this 
                                                 
21 The PF, although giving negative returns the last years, has done better than the reference portfolio, meaning that the 
fund is managed well.  
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section a situation with partially non-traded services will be regarded. It is then possible to 
invest in transforming ‘pre-investment non-traded goods’ to ‘post-investment traded goods’. 
First, let us discuss why the question about making initially non-traded goods traded, is 
worth asking. Diagram 15 shows how the possibility of buying S-goods from a poor country 
could place the CPS with a vertical instead of a horizontal distance to the PPS. With the 
preferences assumed, this would lead to a higher increase in utility in period two than the 
portfolio investment.  
 
Diagram 15 If S-goods were tradable, and the PF used on services 
 
C
U1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The increase from utility level U1 to U2 is the increased wealth in period two from a 
portfolio investment while the increase from U1 to U4 is the increased utility from using the 
fund to buy services. Utility level U4 is a higher utility level than U2. The whole reason for 
Diagram 15 is the same as 14 but a new red consumption possibility line is added. This red line has an 
overall vertical distance from the PPS equal to the fund and its returns accounted in S goods. This would be the 
new consumption possibility set if S goods, and only S goods, were tradable, and the fund was invested at the 
world market in period two. We see that with the assumed preferences, the utility from the world market 
investment is larger in this case than when C goods are tradable. 
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the former representing a larger welfare improvement is the preference structure that shows a 
tendency towards S-goods. The opposite would be true if the consumers tended to prefer C-
goods.  
This figure and the discussion so far have only expressed that it would have been better 
for the rich country with an increased need for services in the future period if services had 
been traded. So why is this called an investment in the poor country? The only possibility for 
doing so is if there are barriers to trade in services that are possible to break down. In the 
following such barriers are assumed. It is possible to remove the barriers at a cost. 
The rationale for assuming that it is possible to transform a non-traded good, for example 
services, to a traded one, can be of cultural, geographical, informational or institutional 
character. The cultural character might be language. If health care for example should be 
traded, many problems would arise, at least there would be a geographical barrier that might 
have made the trade impossible or the cost extremely high. But if consumers of health 
services were willing to move towards the production point, the barriers to do this would 
probably be of cultural art. A common language would for example be needed. Further 
norms, ethics and other differences might create barriers. The cost would then be to finance 
language and other cultural information and training, and/or simply the transport cost for the 
consumers that have to move to the production point. An example to illustrate this point is 
that Norway has ‘imported’ health services through a state led initiative that sent patients out 
of own country.22 
The lack of willingness to invest in poor countries’ potential high return projects may also 
be that the risks are considered too high. The cost could then be to create institutions, for 
example banks and law institutions. 
Two situations will be regarded in the following; the first assumes a trading cost of fixed 
cost nature while the second consider a unit cost to trade. The unit cost can be reduced if 
investment is done.  
In reality the cost might consist of two elements, one unit cost and one fixed cost. For 
simplicity, however, the two elements are here analysed separately. 
                                                 
22 This has been called pasientbroen (bridge for patients). See for example Botten, G., Grepperud, S. & S.M.Nerland 
(2003). 
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4.3.1       Fixed costs  
 
If the assumed cost is of fixed cost nature, the question of whether the services are traded 
or not, is only a question of whether or not the cost is paid. If the fixed cost can be paid by 
capital alone, the result will be that the petroleum fund can be used to pay that cost and to 
buy services in the next period. The amount of services Norway gets in the second period is 
in this situation equal to the difference between the PF and the fixed cost, accounted in S 
goods.  
The preferences, the size of the fixed cost, and the amount of savings will decide whether 
or not this will lead to a higher utility in period two than the case with portfolio investment.  
 
Diagram 16 The effects in the rich country; S-goods mobility, fixed cost 
 
                   Diagram 16a                                                 Diagram 16b 
 
 
 
 
The vertical distance from the PPS to the CPS is then equal to the difference between the 
return on the fund minus the fixed cost, counted in S goods. 
Diagram 16a shows a situation where the utility from investing in the poor country, U3, is 
higher than the utility from the world market portfolio, U2. Diagram 16b illustrates the 
Diagram 16 shows situations where S goods can be traded after a fixed cost has been paid. In diagram 16a utility 
increase from paying this fixed cost and buy S goods are higher than buying C goods with no costs. In figure 16b the 
opposite is true; it is better to buy c goods than paying the fixed cost and then buying S goods. The only difference 
between a and b is the size of the fixed cost. 
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opposite situation where the utility from the investments in the poor country, U1, is lower 
than U2. The difference between the two situations stems from different size of the fixed 
cost only.     
The effects in the poor country will be similar to the situation described in chapter one, 
but here they will actually get the capital investments because the repayment in S-goods can 
occur. 
 
Diagram 17 The effects in the poor country of S-goods mobility and a fixed cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 17 illustrates the effect in the poor country from the investment in that country. 
The new, brown, price line defines the CPS for the poor country. The poor country will gain 
from the capital and the transformation of services from non-traded to traded goods, as long 
as the price-line is getting less steep. If the fixed cost is as illustrated in diagram 16a, the new 
price line is as steep as the tangent in the point where U3 and the yellow line is tangent. The 
ΔS is the amount of services that goes to the rich country, as repayment of the capital loan.  
The poor country does not have to pay anything of the fixed cost. When investments are done in the poor 
country the PPS shifts out northeast in the diagram. The new price line, the orange line, indicates the new 
relative prices. This line is less steep than the ‘old’ green price line, indicating that C goods are less expensive 
compared to S goods than earlier. The repayment for the capital loan is equal to ΔS. The utility level are thus 
U2 after the investment has been done which is higher than U, the utility level when no investments are done.  
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So, if there is a fixed cost to make the services traded, the CPS’ intersection with the 
second axis will shift upwards as long as the savings increase the fixed cost. Whether the 
point where the indifference curve is tangent to the CPS is superior to the tangent point with 
a portfolio investment, will depend on: 
 
• Preferences 
• The rent on the portfolio 
• The size of the fixed cost 
 
The flatter the indifference curves, the higher the savings and the smaller the fixed costs 
the more likely it is that the direct investments leads to the highest wealth. 
The arguments for modelling the costs as a fixed cost instead of a variable cost depending 
on the amount of S-goods that is traded, is not very robust. The best argument for doing so 
might be that it is easier to analyse, because the after trade (and after cost) relative price will 
be the same in both countries.  
It might also be a problem from modelling the cost as consisting of capital alone. If the 
cost consists of teaching nurses or labour in the poor country Norwegian, the cost will 
probably not consist of capital alone, but also use Norwegian labour. Then the access to 
labour intensive goods, also have to be valued from the fact that labour, the scarce factor is 
used to get this access.  
In the next session it is assumed that the cost is of unit cost type, and that the cost uses 
factors of production in the same amount, as does consumption of S goods. The investment 
to reduce this cost is however assumed to consist of capital alone. By allowing the 
investment to consist of capital alone, some generality and reality is lost, but the gain is the 
simplicity of the analysis.  
 
4.3.2       Unit costs 
 
In this session the PF as a whole is invested to reduce the unit cost on trade in S goods. 
The gains from this investment are the gains from trade in S commodities. The unit cost is 
modelled as what is called an iceberg trading costs. As the name indicates, these costs are 
modelled by assuming that some of the goods shipped melt away before they reach the 
consumers in other countries. 
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If the iceberg costs are so high in the beginning that no trade in services occur this must 
imply that: 
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Where ikP  indicates the consumer price of commodity k in country i and t is the 
proportion of good S that melt away during transportation. This indicates that the cost uses 
factors of production in the same amount as the consumption of S goods. 
Let us assume that t is a decreasing function of the savings used for reducing it:  
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I is the investment to reduce the unit cost on trade in S-goods. The sign on the derivative 
indicates that if savings are invested to reduce the trading cost, then iceberg cost is actually 
reduced.    
All three different signs on the second derivative are possible. The most common 
assumption to make is that the second derivative of an investment is the opposite of its first 
derivative, so that the effect of the investment decreases with the size of the same 
investment. The logic of assuming this is that there are gains to exploit by the investment, 
but when investment is made, there is less and less left to exploit.  
It might be possible in this case, however, that the second derivative is negative, meaning 
that such an investment has an increasing effect on the iceberg trading cost. To understand 
this, we first have to look at what kinds of investments could be done to reduce unit trade 
costs on services. This will certainly depend on what kind of services we have in mind.  
Health- and care services for example, are most often produced at the consumption point. 
The easiest way to make S-goods traded might be to transport the consumers to the 
production point in the poor country. The unit trading cost could then be interpreted solely 
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by transport cost of the pensioners or patients. Probably, though, there are more costs 
involved than that. If the elderly Norwegians are going to spend their everyday lives in 
another country than their home country, this might make a social disutility that could be 
compensated. Further and maybe more easily modelled, is the cost of teaching nurses and 
care keepers Norwegian or the pensioners English or another common language in their host 
country. In such inter-country relationship, an understanding of culture and tradition in the 
other country is important. Schooling in culture, history and language for both producers and 
consumers could thus make a cost. 
Information services on the other hand, can be produced far away from the consumption 
and transported without cost or with small costs through Internet or by use of telephone for 
example. The cost of making these goods traded might then be to match producer and 
consumer, by gathering the information on consumers’ needs and producers’ resources.  
Both education and knowledge gathering might have increasing returns features and 
positive externalities. The more nurses one have taught English, or Norwegian, the more will 
maybe nurses at the same hospitals without schooling, get to know. And know-how on 
consumers’ needs and producers’ resources might create better access to more such 
knowledge. 
As the assumption here is that there are only three countries in the world, one big world 
market, one small poor country, and one small rich country, there is no need for assuming 
anything about the second derivative to secure that there will be a solution.23 The PF size is 
limited and so is the unit cost. Therefore there is a constraint on the investment that means 
that although increasing returns on the investment, it has a defined solution. Even if the 
assumption on the second derivative is not deciding whether a solution to the problem occurs 
or not, it is certainly crucial to how profitable the investment is. If the second derivative is 
negative the probability that the investment in the poor country is superior to the other 
investment possibilities is higher.    
For trade to occur in this situation, one must assume that the price for the consumers in 
the rich countries will be lower for goods from the poor country, even after some goods melt 
away, than the autarky level. 
                                                 
23 If the world market consisted of many countries that had the same production possibilities as the poor country described 
here, one could, if the second derivative of the t function was positive, get the solution that it would be profitable for the 
rich country to invest in more than one poor country.  But with the assumptions made here, all three possible signs secures 
that either one invest in the one poor country, otherwise one does not invest in any poor country.      
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Whether or not it is preferable to the portfolio investment, to invest to reduce the unit 
trade cost, will depend on: 
 
• The function )(Itt = , where 0<′t . 
• Preferences 
• Rent from the portfolio investment 
 
For the poor country the same is true as was true in the last chapter; as long as the price-
line gets flatter, the consumers reach a higher utility level. 
Using top-print R to denote the rich country and P to denote the poor country, and 
bottom-letter C to denote the traded good and S to denote the initial non-traded good, the 
relationship between consumer prices in the two countries, if trade and no specialization 
occur can be expressed by: 
 
(44) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
))(1( ItP
P
P
P
P
S
P
C
R
S
R
C  
 
 
4.3.2.1 The Norman and Venables (1995) model24 
 
The Venables and Norman (1995) study introduces an iceberg trading cost, in one of the 
sectors in the HOS framework, in the way done here, and find solutions to when trade occurs 
and not, similar to equation (43). An introduction to their model is given in the following. 
They first assume that both goods are tradable, one with a unit iceberg trading cost and the 
other costless, while the factor of production are perfectly immobile between countries. The 
algebra and solutions to this state will be given in this section. Secondly, they open for the 
                                                 
24 The notation has been changed to fit to the notation used in this thesis. 
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possibility of both factor trade and goods trade; which will be the combination of the two 
proposals here in section 4.3 and 4.4. Section 4.4 analyse the situation where capital is 
mobile while labour is mobile only at a cost. 
The difference regarding the goods trade with unit costs, as discussed here, and the 
Norman and Venables (1995) framework, is the planning perspective. The Venables and 
Norman (1995) is a technical solution to when trade actually occurs and when trade does not 
occur, without any strategy solution, as to whether or not an investment to reduce the trading 
cost should be done in the period before.  
Venables and Norman (1995) set up a full model in the HOS-framework with iceberg unit 
trade costs in one sector, allowing for factor mobility. The framework here is therefore 
similar to appendix B, but an additional element, the iceberg trading cost, is incorporated. 
They allow for the possibility of factor mobility of a composite factor.  
Venables and Norman (V&N) let the commodity that is traded with no cost be a 
numeraire. In the following C goods will therefore be taken as a numeraire, resulting in the 
price of C goods being normalised to one: 
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The relative price will therefore be expressed as  
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They assume non-specialisation and perfect competitive economies in addition to 
identical technologies in both countries. The unit cost functions, 1b  and 2b will then equal 
the prices: 
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Further the equilibrium factor prices can be expressed as a function of the price of good 
one: 
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w and r indicates the wage and the rent on capital as before.25 The sign of the derivatives 
result from the assumption that S is labour intensive in production, and expresses a Stolper-
Samuelson effect. 
Output levels are determined by factor market clearing for each factor in each country. By 
use of Shephard’s lemma this can be written as: 
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Where iK  and iL  indicates the exogenously given amounts of capital and labour in 
country i.  
Norman and Venables define a variable, z, which expresses the relative factor 
endowments in the trading world (which consists of the rich and the poor country only) and 
the two countries, respectively: 
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The world endowment ratio is a weighted sum of the two countries’ endowment ratios: 
 
(53) wPR zzz =−+ )1( λλ  
 
The weighting factor, λ, is given by: 
 
                                                 
25 This same relation, although in relative terms, is expressed in the fourth quadrant in diagram B1. 
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Each country’s relative supply of goods, X, can be expressed as a function of goods prices 
and relative endowment ratios: 
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The signs of the derivatives are results of the assumed factor intensities, and they express 
Rybsczynski effects. 
The demand side of their framework is expressed by use of an aggregate consumer in 
each country, with utility level iu and expenditure function per unit utility )( 1
iPe . The 
consumer’s budget constraint in autarky can then be expressed as: 
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Due to homothetic preferences the ratio of consumption, 
C
C
C
S
, can be expressed as a 
function of goods prices: 
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The autarky equilibrium is then found by finding the relative quantities and the relative 
price levels from (55) and (57).26 Factor prices are then found from (48) and (49).27  
They assume for simplicity, as done above, that transactions use primary factors in the 
same proportion, as does consumption. The transaction costs of country i consumers can 
then be expressed by: 
 
                                                 
26 This could be illustrated in the way done in the first quadrant in diagram B1  
27 This could be illustrated by the fourth quadrant in diagram B1. 
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Where t is the same as the iceberg trade cost named t earlier in this section. 
When the planning aspect is introduced within this framework, the τ  should be expressed 
as a function of the investments done to reduce it: 
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Norman and Venables assume that the costs are incurred in the source country, so that the 
function )( iSPe  is evaluated at the source country price. 
International trade does not now equate goods prices, but places a boundary on the 
difference between them. This boundary is as follows: 
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In particular, when S goods is exported from the poor country to the rich country: 
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Equation (60) expresses the same as equation (44). 
 
By assumption the Poor country is relatively labour abundant, so we have: 
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If )()( IPe PS τ  is greater than the difference between the prices, no trade will occur. 
If )()( IPe RS τ  is less than the price difference, it will be profitable to trade. 
 
Whether or not trade occurs depends on the value of the function τ , on preferences, 
technology and endowments. 
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If wz  and λ are given, we can find four equations that have to be satisfied for the 
economies to be on the boundary between trade and no trade: 
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By varying λ we can trace the locus of this boundary in factor endowment space. The 
boundary values is called Rzˆ  and Pzˆ  and can be named the goods trade boundary. 
By inverting (62) and (63) we get: 
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The function ψ  gives the autarky price ratio as a function of the endowment ratio. With 
the assumed factor intensities it must be the case that 0'≤ψ . The assumption here is that 
0'<ψ . 
Using equation (66) in equation (64) gives: 
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Since 0'<ψ  it follows that Rzˆ > Pzˆ , and from (65) we se that wR zz →ˆ  as 1→λ  and 
wR zz →ˆ  as 0→λ . Totally differentiating equation (65) and (67) and eliminating Pzdˆ  give: 
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Since PR zz >  this implies: 
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Rzˆ  decreases monotonically to wz  as λ increases to unity. By varying λ from zero to 
unity it is possible to draw the trade boundary in an endowment box. 
 
Diagram 18 The goods trade boundary 
 
The curved line shows the boundary between trade and no trade, while the shaded area is 
the area where no trade occurs. When the investment increases, the boundary will shift 
northwest, with the result that it is less probably that the two countries end in a situation with 
no trade.  
Since neither goods prices nor factor prices will be equalised in equilibrium, statements 
about factor content of consumption is not straightforward. Venables and Norman assume 
that technological coefficients are fixed and equal in both countries. With this assumption it 
must be the case that the factor content of consumption lays on the curved line. This is due to 
the fact that both (64) and (65) hold in equilibrium.  
Equation (62) and (63) can be interpreted as implicitly defining the factor content of 
consumption in each country, since, with the same techniques of production in use in both 
countries, relative demands )( RSPD and )(
P
SPD generate factor demands 
Rzˆ  and Pzˆ .  
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Diagram 19 Consumption, endowments and vectors of trade 
 
If the initial endowment is at a point such as E, the factor content of consumption will be at a 
point such as Co. The factor content of trade, with given technologies used in production, 
could be: P exports vector ED of factors embodied in good S, and imports vector DC 
embodied in good C.28 
 
4.4       Immigration 
 
In this section we will return to a situation where S goods is non-traded by assumption. It 
is assumed, however, that the labour is mobile, but at a cost. First the fixed cost nature on 
labour movements is assumed, later the unit cost possibility is assumed. 
An important discussion relating the mobility of labour is whether or not the labour in 
different countries is homogenous. The cost relating labour movements might consist of 
making different labour homogenous. Nurses from the poor country might have to learn 
                                                 
28 The gradients of ED and DC give the factor proportions used in production of goods S and C respectively, and the 
position of Co relative to E comes from the budget constraint, depending on factor prices and trade costs. 
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Norwegian before moving to Norway, to work at Norwegian hospitals. The assumption in 
the HOS framework is that the labour is homogenous within and between countries.29  
A second concern related to the mobility of labour is the distribution of income in the rich 
country when open up for migration. It is already shown within the simple neoclassical 
production function that with increased amount of labour to capital the ratio of wage to 
return on capital is reduced. This can also be seen within the HOS framework, as long as 
there is not perfectly free trade in commodity or factor markets.30  
Immigration of labour from poor countries to the OECD does not appear in large scale 
today. The reasons for this may be twofold; first the OECD countries do not want 
immigrants to come, second the poor country labour might want to stay in own country. 
Today the first is more realistic because we know that poor country labour wants to get into 
the OECD countries. However we do not know till what extent the poor country inhabitants 
are mobile. Labour might occur to be less mobile than one could expect by studying 
economic frameworks, for example like the one used here.  
The OECD countries may have many different reasons to resist labour migration. Two 
examples are the following: 
 
• Distributional concerns, as mentioned above 
• Valuing own labour and migrating labour as heterogenous 
 
The cost of immigration could then be the disutility from these negative effects of 
immigration. The investments to reduce it, or the fixed cost to remove it, could then consist 
of reducing or removing these effects. This could be done for example by: 
 
• Implementing distribution programmes 
• ‘Making the migrating labour and own labour homogenous’ 
 
The second point about making foreign labour homogenous to Norwegian labour could 
perhaps be done by schooling. This is similar to the discussion in section 4.3. Teaching 
foreign labour Norwegian languages and habits and so on could be done. On the other hand, 
                                                 
29 It is possible, though, that the problem of heterogenous labour could be analysed within a Ricardo-Viner framework, 
where the most usual assumption is sector-specific capital 
30 This can be shown by for example shifting the curves in the fourth quadrant in diagram B1  
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the consumers in Norway could of course also learn about habits and cultural characteristics 
in the poor country.   
The cost of making the immobile labour mobile will in the following be modelled first as 
a fixed cost and then as a unit cost on migration. As in the last section, the argument for 
assuming that the cost is of fixed cost nature is not robust, and perhaps the cost should be 
considered consisting of two elements; one fixed cost and one unit cost. For simplicity and 
illustration the two elements is analysed separately, as was also the case for section 4.3.     
 
4.4.1 Fixed cost 
 
If there is a fixed cost that has to be paid for the Norwegian Government to get access to the 
poor country’s labour, and the labour movement actually occurs, the PPS for Norway will 
shift out. The simplest possible case to analyse is the case where the fixed cost can be paid 
by capital alone, the repayment for the labour loan is in capital, and the migrants still 
consume in their home country. The Norwegian PPS will shift as shown in diagram 20. 
 
Diagram 20 Labour migration at a fixed cost 
 
The blue PPS illustrates one possible outcome of labour mobility at a fixed cost. The 
resulting utility level U is here drawn as a higher utility level than the utility level labelled 
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U2, when investment in own country is done. This will certainly depend on how high the 
fixed cost is, and it is indeed possible that the utility level when following this strategy is 
lower than the utility level when investing in own country. The higher the fixed cost, the 
higher is the probability that the other investment possibilities are preferable to the poor 
country investment. 
 
4.4.2 Variable iceberg cost 
 
The analysis of the unit cost on migration is following the Norman and Venables (1995) 
model. When allowing for factor mobility Norman and Venables take a general view and 
allow for movements of a composite factor. The composite is exogenously specified. It could 
be the case that labour migrates with some capital, or foreign investments might cause labour 
to move. The share of labour in the composite is given by a parameter α. The movement of 
the composite factor is possible at a cost, γ)( iSPe . 
Incorporating the planning perspective also in this section, the cost function in period two 
can be expressed by the savings done to reduce it, I, in period one: 
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Further they allow for the possibility that factors moving can consume either in their 
destination country or in their country of origin. Migrated labour would probably not send all 
their earnings to their family and friends in their country of origin. It is not unreasonable, 
though, that some of their earnings would be sent back. Norman and Venables regard the two 
border cases, only; either the factors consume in their destination country or in their country 
of origin. The parameter β takes the value 1 if all consumption takes place in the country of 
origin, while β equals 0 if consumption takes place in the destination country. 
The return to the composite factor can then be expressed as a function, y, of α, β, r, w and 
e: 
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Where r, w and e are given the interpretations as in section 4.3. 
Labour movement is discussed in this section, so the interesting case is when α equals 
one. Equation (72) will then equal: 
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when β equals one, and the migrating labour still consumes in their home, poor, country. 
When β equals 0, however, and the consumption takes place in the rich, host, country, 
equation (72) will equal: 
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The bounds that the possibility of factor movements place on the home and foreign values 
of y is given by: 
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When the migrating labour consumes in the host country (β = 0) this will equal: 
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When the migration labour consumes in their country of origin (β = 1), however, this will 
equal: 
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We know that if labour movements occur it will be from P to R, this will imply that the 
difference ),;(),;( βαβα RSPS PyPy −  will be positive in the initial situation. In this case the 
first equality/inequality will be the possible situations.  
71 
The following must then also be true (if trade occurs): 
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When there is no trade in S goods it is possible to find the values of Rz  and Pz , 
respectively that gives the boundary for factor trade to occur. Calculating the following 
equations does this:  
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The method is the same as in the former section, and it is possible to find a factor trade 
boundary, which is qualitatively similar to the goods trade boundary. 
 
Diagram 21 Factor trade and goods trade boundaries 
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Norman and Venables consider both the possibility of factor movements and the 
possibility of goods movement at the same time, i.e. they allow the two situations described 
in section 4.3 and 4.4 simultaneously.   
Whether goods trade or factor trade occurs, depend on the relative positions of the goods 
trade and factor trade boundaries. If the factor trade boundary is closest to the diagonal, the 
goods trade boundary is irrelevant. Since the factor trade boundary is closer to the diagonal, 
it has smaller international endowment ratio differences and hence smaller goods and factor 
price differences. Factor trade thus ensures that international differences in the price of 
labour and capital are never large enough to support a goods price difference as large as the 
transaction cost on S goods. The opposite will be true if the goods trade boundary is closer to 
the diagonal than the factor trade boundary. In the shaded area there will be no trade, neither 
factor nor goods movements.  
In the area between the two curved lines there will be trade in either goods or factors 
depending on which boundary is the one closest to the diagonal. If the factor trade boundary 
is the one closest to the diagonal, there will be no trade in S goods. Whether or not there will 
be trade in C goods depends on the value of β. If β is 1, the labour consumes in the country 
of origin and C is sent from P to R. If β equals zero however there will be no trade C. 
The next discussion will then be under what circumstances the goods trade boundary 
would lie below the factor trade boundary. This is done formally in the Norman and 
Venables study.  
Whether or not an investment to reduce the cost of migration is superior to the three other 
investment possibilities is thus dependent on: 
 
• The size of the fixed cost or the unit cost function, )(Iγ , on migration 
• The size of the fixed cost or the unit cost function, )(Iτ , on trade in S goods 
• Consumer preferences 
• The return on the world market portfolio 
• Production possibilities in own country 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis in this thesis: 
• The demographic situation in the OECD countries results in a problem on how to 
meet future consumption needs. It is not obvious, though, that the solution to this 
problem is to change the existing pension systems. 
• When saving for future consumption needs one should take into consideration that 
increased saving in one region might reduce the return on investments in that same 
region.  
• One possible explanation to the Lucas’ paradox is that labour intensive goods tend 
to be more of the non-traded sort than the more capital intensive goods. Capital 
will thus not move to poor countries unless the rich countries are deindustrialised, 
and the poor countries industrialised. 
• In addition to the expected return consideration, it is also important for a nation 
experiencing increased ratio elderly/working part of the population, to discuss 
which goods/services are needed in the future. Elderly needs services to a larger 
extent than the rest of the population, and when experiencing a shortage of labour 
supply, it should be discussed how the needed services can be put in place. 
• Whether a world market portfolio investment is superior to investment in own 
country, investment in own country, investment in a poor country, or migration, 
depends on consumer preferences, the return on the portfolio investment, 
production possibilities in own country, trading costs on services, and the cost on 
migration. The higher the return on the portfolio investment, the more capital 
abundant the country is initially, the higher the trading costs on services and cost 
on migration, the more likely that the portfolio investment is the best investment 
strategy. Regarding consumer preferences one has to be careful about comparing 
different preference structure, but the more consumers prefer services to other 
goods, the more important is it that the investment strategy is able to obtain 
services. This could be an argument for the investment in the poor country or the 
migration strategy to be preferable to the portfolio investment.  
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Appendix A 
The SSB calculations 
 
The predictions of the future labour force and the benefits needed to pay pensions are to a large 
degree dependent on the assumptions done in the calculus. The population numbers have been taken 
from the intermediate alternative from the last population projections done by the Bureau of 
Statistics.31 The assumptions made are: 
 
• Immigration: 13 000 persons each year 
• Fertility rate: 1,8 
• Life expectancy: Grow at approximately 0.15 year per year for the whole period considered 
here 
• The tendency to study: Approximately at the 2001 level 
• Vocational occupational rehabilitation (attføring), disablement pension and 
AFP:32Approximately at the 2001 level 
• Retirement age: 67 
• Participation rates and average working time ordered after gender, age, schooling, 
educational level, status as a retired, children etc: Approximately as in 2001 
• Prices, wages and base amount:33 As in 2001 
 
                                                 
31 Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB) 
32 Avtalefestet pensjon (AFP) is a Norwegian term referring to a program for early retirement in Norway  
33 Base amount (G) in Norway, was in 2002 (on average) 53 232 NOK. G is regulated according to changes in the average 
real wage in Norway and pension payments are counted in G’s. 
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Appendix B 
A more mathematical description34  
B1 The factor market equilibrium 
Assume that the production functions homogenous of degree one. The unit cost functions then 
depend on factor prices only, and not the scale of production. Let the unit cost function be given by: 
(B1) ),( rwcc ii =   
The letters label the same variables as in chapter 3. w is the wage and r is the rent on capital, 
CSi ,= . 
The cost functions will then be expressed by: 
(B2) SrwcX SS ),(=  
(B3) CrwcX CC ),(=  
By use of Shepherd’s lemma, the labour used in the S sector is found to be: 
(B4) ScS
w
c
L LS
S
S =∂
∂=  
and similar for the C-industry. ijc  expresses the derivative of the unit cost function with respect to 
w and r respectively, j = S, C. 
We then have that 
(B5) 0KCcSc KCKS =+  
(B6) 0LCcSc LCLS =+  
By differentiating the system: 
(B7) 00 ==+++ dLdCcCdcdScSdc LCLCLSLS  
(B8) 00 ==+++ dKdCcCdcdScSdc KCKCCSCS  
By simplifying and finding the relative terms35: 
(B9) 0)ˆˆ()ˆˆ( dLCcCcScSc LCLCLSLS =+++  
⇒  
                                                 
34 The calculus is the similar (although shorter) to the one done in Klette (2001) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) 
35 A relative change in a variable will be denoted in the following way: 
V
dVV =ˆ , V being any one variable. 
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(B10) )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ
0
0
0 CcScL
dLL LCLCLSLS +++== λλ  
Where ijλ  gives the share of i = L,K that is employed in sector j = S,C. 
For the capital market, the corresponding expression will be: 
(B11) )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ
0
0
0 CcScK
dK
K KCKCKSKS +++== λλ  
The expression jij ˆλ , j = S, C respectively, captures the changes in production levels, while factor 
substitution is captured by ijij cˆλ . 
The expression for ijcˆ : 
(B12) 
LS
LCSLLS
LS
LS
c
drcdwc
c
dc )( +=  
Where 
(B13) 22 /),( wrwcc SLLS ∂∂=   
(B14) rwrwcc SLCS ∂∂∂= /),(2  
ijc  is homogenous of degree zero in w and r, due to the fact that SLc SLS /=  only depends on 
factor prices. 
We then have: 
(B15) 0=+ rcwc LCSLLS  
⇒   
(B16) LLSLCS crwc )/(−=  
By inserting (B16) in (B12): 
(B17) 
LS
LLSLLS
LS
LS
c
drcrwdwc
c
dc ))/(( −+=  
We are interested in simplifying this equation and expressing it as a function of the technical rate 
of substitution. When assuming that the factor markets are characterised with perfect competition, the 
technical rate of substitution can be expressed in the following way: 
(B18) 
KSLS
XLLS
S crc
cwc−=σ  
To express LScˆ  as a function of Sσ , (B18) can be rearranged in the following way: 
(B19) )ˆˆ(ˆ rw
crc
cwc
c
rc
c
KSLS
SLLS
S
KS
LS −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−−=  
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The first expression on the right hand side of this equation will be called CSθ , and is the factor 
share of capital in the production of S goods. The next expression is the technical rate of substitution, 
Sσ .36  
This will give us the more simple equations: 
(B20) )ˆˆ(ˆ rwc SKSLS −−= σθ  
(B21) )ˆˆ(ˆ rwc CKCLC −−= σθ  
(B22) )ˆˆ(ˆ rwc SLSKS −= σθ  
(B23) )ˆˆ(ˆ rwc CLCKC −= σθ  
If we insert these four equations in the factor market equilibrium, the following equation for the 
labour market will hold:  
(B24) LSSKSLCCKCLCLS rwrwCSL λσθλσθλλ )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ0 −−−−+=  
⇒ 
(B25) 0ˆ))(ˆˆ(ˆˆ LrwCS LSSKSLCCKCLCLS ++−=+ λσθλσθλλ  
The corresponding equation for the capital market is: 
(B26) KCCLCKSSLSKCKS rwrwCSK λσθλσθλλ )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ 0 −+−++=  
⇒ 
(B27) 0ˆ))(ˆˆ(ˆˆ KrwCS KCCLCKSSLSKCKS ++−−=+ λσθλσθλλ   
Subtracting (B27) from (B25) gives the final expression for the factor-market equilibrium: 
(B28) 00
* ˆˆ))(ˆˆ()ˆˆ( KLrwCS CCSS −++−=− σασαλ  
Where 
(B29) LCKCKSLS λλλλλ −=−=*  
(B30) KSLSLSKSS λθλθα +=  
(B31) KCLCLCKCC λθλθα +=  
 
As long as 0* >λ , i.e. the S sector is relatively labour intensive in production, there will be a 
positive relationship between )/( KS  and )/( rw . An increase in the labour force will give a 
positive shift in northeast direction, while increased capital will lead to a negative shift in south 
western direction. 
                                                 
36 To see the relationship between Sσ  and the more usual definition of the technical rate of substitution via the production 
function, the latter can be expressed by: 
)/log(
log
)/log(
log
)/log(
)/log(
rwd
Ld
rwd
Kd
wrd
LKd
S −=−=σ .  
80 
 
B2 Connection between factor prices and commodity prices 
With constant returns to scale and perfect competition, the commodity prices will be equal to the 
unit cost functions:  
(B32) ),( rwcP SS =  
(B33) ),( rwcP CC =  
⇒ 
(B34) rwr
c
rcw
c
wcP KSLS
S
KS
S
LS
S ˆˆˆˆˆ θθ +=+=  
(B35) rwP KCLCC ˆˆˆ θθ +=  
⇒ 
(B36) )ˆˆ(ˆˆ * rwPP CS −=− θ  
Where 
(B37) KSKCLCLS θθθθθ −=−=*  
If 0* >θ  there will be a positive relationship between 
C
S
P
P
 and 
r
w
. This will be the case when S 
goods are relatively labour intensive in production, i.e. when 0* >λ . 
 
B3 Demand side 
I will introduce a demand side with homothetic preferences: 
(B38) )ˆˆ(ˆˆ CSD PPCS −−=− σ  
Dσ  is the elasticity of substitution on the demand side, Dσ >0. 
 
B4 The relative price levels 
Combining all the relationships in the previous calculations gives the four-quadrant figure below, 
diagram B1. The first quadrant gives the demand relationship and the supply that will be derived 
from the factor-market equilibrium (4th quadrant) and the relationship between goods-prices and 
factor-prices (second quadrant). The third quadrant simply shows that the relative factor-prices in the 
second quadrant have to be equal to the relative prices in the fourth quadrant.  
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Diagram 22(B1)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the figure we see that a poor country with relatively less capital per labour unit, will have 
lower relative price level than the rich country in the autarky situation. In the integrated equilibrium, 
the two countries will have an equal price level, between the two autarky levels. 
 
(B39) OCS
OD
CS
D
CS PPPPPP )/()/()/( << +  
 
The integrated equilibrium price level ODCS PP
+)/( can then be found either by using these 
equations and diagram B.1 or in a diagram for the two countries’ total production as done in diagram 
7. With help of the indifference curves in diagram 7 it is also possible to find the consumption point 
The only difference between the OECD and the Developing country is the relative factor endowments (4th quadrant). 
This difference results in different autarky supply curves for the two countries (1st quadrant). The supply functions 
for the two countries are found by drawing relationships for different prices and find factor prices (2nd quadrant) and 
corresponding relative production of goods (4th quadrant). The 3rd quadrant simply states that the factor prices in the 
supply market have two be equal to the factor prices in the factor market. The arrows making different rectangles 
indicate the method of constructing the supply curves. The world factor market relation (4th quadrant will lie between 
the two countries’ factor relation. This results in a world supply curve that lays in the middle of the two countries 
supply curves. 
